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Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation*
Stuart S. Glennan
Butler University
Internet: sglennan@butler.edu
[This is a text-version of the paper which appears in Erkenntnis 44, 49-71.]

ABSTRACT
In this paper I offer an analysis of causation based upon a theory of mechanisms –
complex systems whose "internal" parts interact to produce a system's "external"
behavior. I argue that all but the fundamental laws of physics can be explained by
reference to mechanisms.
Mechanisms provide an epistemologically
unproblematic way to explain the necessity which is often taken to distinguish
laws from other generalizations. This account of necessity leads to a theory of
causation according to which events are causally related when there is a
mechanism that connects them. I present reasons why the lack of an account of
fundamental physical causation does not undermine the mechanical account.
1.

HUME'S PROBLEM

[E]xperience only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another, without
instructing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together and renders
them inseparable (Hume, 1777, p. 63).
Experience, according to Hume, cannot tell us about the "secret connexion" which binds
together events. When we attend to a supposed causal interaction, for instance, a moving billiard
ball colliding with a stationary billiard ball, we can observe the motion of the first ball and then
the motion of the second, but we can not observe a connection between the two. Furthermore,
no number of further observations would allow us to observe any connection.
Hume's problem is that, although we can observe regular conjunctions in nature, we can
never see the "secret connexion" which binds them together. It would seem therefore that we can
never have know what causes one event to follow another. His "skeptical solution" to this
problem is to define the notion of cause in such a way that it makes no reference to a connection,
but only to constant conjunction. He defines a cause to be "an object, followed by another, and
where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second" (Hume,
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1777, p. 76).

This definition is the germ of the regularity theory of causation which has

dominated empiricist discussions of causation ever since.1
Although Hume's argument that no number of observations can yield an impression of a
connection is, in my view at least, irrefutable, I do not think that that argument requires us to
adopt a regularity view of causation. In this paper I will try to suggest an alternative that I call a
mechanical theory of causation. The intuition behind the theory is straightforward. When I
claim that some event causes another event, say that my turning the key causes my car to start, I
do not believe this simply because I have routinely observed that turning the key is followed by
the engine starting. I believe this because I believe that there is a mechanism that connects keyturning to engine-starting. I believe that the key closes a switch which causes the battery to turn
the starter motor and so forth. Furthermore, this is not a "secret connexion". I can look under the
hood and see how the mechanism works.2
There is an obvious objection to this sort of explanation. Although it works for cases like
the key starting the car, there is a very important class of cases for which it does not. It is not
possible, for instance, to look at the mechanism which causes two bodies to gravitationally attract
each other. So far as we understand this interaction between bodies, there is no underlying
mechanism which explains it. It is just a "brute fact" about the world in which we live. In this
case we cannot explain the interaction by reference to any mechanism. Here some form of
regularity theory seems plausible. The problem with the regularity theory is not that it is an
incorrect analysis of such cases, but that it fails to distinguish these from cases where there is a
discernible mechanism. The vast majority of cases are of the latter sort.
My aim in this paper is to offer an analysis of the concept of mechanism. At the
conclusion of the paper I indicate how this analysis can be put to work in a theory of causation. I
emphasize the fact that this theory cannot explain causation in fundamental physics. I suggest
that there should be a dichotomy in our understanding of causation between the case of
fundamental physics and that of other sciences (including much of physics itself).

1

I do not wish in this introduction to make claims about the proper interpretation of Hume. In
particular, I am ignoring the following question: Does Hume's skepticism lead him to believe
that there are no powers behind regularities, or only that these powers are unknowable?
Although twentieth century empiricists tend to argue for the former interpretation, the textual
evidence is not decisive. For a defense of the latter view, see Strawson (1989). Whatever the
correct interpretation of Hume, it is sufficient for my purposes that Hume's argument is often
taken as leading to the regularity theory of causation.
2

I should emphasize that I do not personally need to have any knowledge of what is under the
hood in order to make a causal claim. It is sufficient that I believe that there is something under
the hood which experts understand or which is open to empirical investigation.
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Mechanical theories of causation are not new.

The central tenet of the Mechanist

movement in the seventeenth century was that all natural phenomena were explicable as the
result of the action of mechanisms composed of corpuscles.3 To say that some event caused
another event was just to say that there is a mechanical linkage between the two, where this
linkage was understood as a collection of corpuscles or larger rigid bodies pushing on each other.
The failure of the Mechanist movement to provide an enduringly adequate account of causation
stems, I think, from two problems — one scientific and one epistemological. The scientific
problem has to do with the Mechanists' views about the microstructure of matter and the forces
which govern interactions between matter. Mechanists advocated Democritean style theories in
which the universe consists of a large (or infinite) collection of corpuscles which interact with
each other only by collision (or perhaps more extended pushes). The admissible principles of
interaction are what we would call "strictly mechanical principles", i.e., the sort of principles
with which one would construct a mechanical (rather than say an electronic) device. It was
believed that all apparently non-mechanical forces, such as gravitation and magnetism, could
ultimately be explained as the actions of mechanisms consisting of corpuscles pushing on each
other. This point of view has proved untenable in light of subsequent scientific developments.
Physical forces such as gravitation and electromagnetism have resisted narrowly mechanical
explanation.
The epistemological problem with seventeenth-century Mechanism has to do with the
testability of mechanical theories. Mechanist explanations of natural phenomena are often
dominated by baroque accounts of mechanisms that are not of discernible physical consequence
(see, e.g., the discussion of gravity in Descartes, 1664).

Although Descartes and other

mechanists claimed that all phenomena could be explained in terms of size, shape and motion of
corpuscles, very little was said about how these corpuscles and their properties could be observed
(or how we could make inferences about them on the basis of observables).
The account of mechanisms that I will develop is largely inspired by insights of the
Mechanical philosophers. I hope, however, that my analysis will avoid these two pitfalls. In the
first place, mechanisms must be conceived in such a way that there are not a priori restrictions
on the sorts of allowable interactions which may take place between a mechanism's parts.
Additionally, analysis of causal connections in terms of mechanisms is only meaningful when
there are ways (even if indirect) of acquiring knowledge of their parts and the interactions
between them.

3

For a discussion of Mechanism and Corpuscularism in the seventeenth century see Glennan
(1992, ch. 2).
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In the remainder of the paper I will present an account of mechanisms and show how it
provides the foundation for a theory of causation. Section II of this paper presents my analysis of
mechanisms. Section III applies this analysis to two simple systems. Section IV discusses some
relationships between mechanisms and laws. Section V shows how the analysis of mechanisms
can be used to formulate a theory of causation

2. AN ANALYSIS OF MECHANISMS
There are two senses in which the term 'mechanism' is commonly used. The first sense
refers narrowly to the internal works of machines, as when one speaks of a clock mechanism.
The second refers more generally to complex systems analogous to machines, as when one
speaks of a human perceptual mechanism or a market mechanism.
summarized by a definition which is meant to capture this latter usage:

My analysis can be

(M)

A mechanism underlying a behavior is a complex system which produces
that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts according to direct
causal laws.
Notice that (M) is a definition of a 'mechanism underlying a behavior' rather than a
mechanism simpliciter. One cannot even identify a mechanism without saying what it is that the
mechanism does. The boundaries of the system, the division of it into parts, and the relevant
modes of interaction between these parts depend upon what the behavior we seek to explain.
Furthermore, complex systems do many things at once. If one isolates a complex system by
some kind of physical description, one can identify indefinitely many behaviors of that system
(Kauffman, 1970). A complex system has many mechanisms underlying its different behaviors.
The polymorphous behavior of complex systems can be illustrated by considering the
behaviors of the human body. Two of the many subsystems of the human body are the
cardiovascular and respiratory systems. Each of these systems has mechanisms for doing certain
things (pumping blood, inhaling oxygen and exhaling carbon-dioxide) and with regard to one of
these (oxygenating blood) the two systems interact in such a way that they must be considered as
a composite. These systems divide the body up in different ways. The cardiovascular system
divides it into the heart, veins, arteries, capillaries, etc. The respiratory system divides it into
lungs, diaphragm, windpipe, mouth, etc. The physical extensions of the systems and their parts
overlap; there are, e.g., veins and arteries running through the various parts of the respiratory
system. The choice of decomposition into parts depends upon the capacity or behavior to be
explained (Wimsatt, 1972).
Although the choice of decomposition depends upon what is being explained,
decompositions are not merely artifacts of the description. Veins and lungs are both really parts
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of human bodies, even though they overlap. Descriptions of mechanisms are good descriptions
insofar as they describe what is "really" there. This point deserves emphasis because the contextdependence of systematic decomposition is often taken to imply anti-realism or relativism.
Simple examples such as the one above show that there is no such implication.
The behavior in question may be something a mechanism was designed to do (or selected
for), but it need not be. Consider two behaviors of a combustion engine: the motion of a drive
shaft and the production of heat. Either of these behaviors may be legitimately mechanically
explained. However, the engine is designed to move the drive shaft, while the heat produced is
merely a side-effect. When one considers designed artifacts or systems that have evolved under
selection pressures, explanatory context often dictates analyzing the system in terms of its
production of the designed or selected behavior, but one could choose any other behavior of these
systems as well. In fact, one can investigate mechanisms which cannot in any interesting sense
be said to have a purpose. One can consider, e.g., the solar system as a mechanism underlying
the motions of the earth (or the planets) even though one believes that this motion is not
purposive.4
In order for (M) to be sufficiently general it is important that a very wide variety of
entities may be parts of mechanisms. Parts may be simple or complex in internal structure, they
need not be spatially localizable, and they need not be describable in a purely physical
vocabulary. In certain contexts, for instance, one might wish to consider genetic mechanisms
whose parts are genes or information processing mechanisms whose parts are software modules
or data structures. There are, however, certain kinds of entities which, to prevent (M) from being
vacuous, should not be allowed to be parts of mechanisms. The parts of mechanisms must have
a kind of robustness and reality apart from their place within that mechanism. It should in
principle be possible to take the part out of the mechanism and consider its properties in another
context. Care must be taken so that parts are neither merely properties of the system as a whole
nor artifacts of the descriptional vocabulary. I shall summarize these restrictions by saying that
parts must be objects.5

4

Since (M) ignores etiological or teleological constraints, it makes very few restrictions on what
could count as a mechanism. For instance, it is quite possible to describe my belt as a
mechanism for stopping bullets. Generally a mechanism such as this is not worthy of
investigation, but we can imagine contexts where it would be. If I was saved from an untimely
death because a bullet ricocheted off of my buckle then this mechanism would not seem so silly.

5

I do not mean here to give a definitive analysis of the notion of object. I do, however, think that
my use of the term is plausible, because whatever objects are, it seems to be important that they
can exist in a variety of contexts.
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The significance of these restrictions can be illustrated by considering whether or not it is
possible to give a mechanical explanation of the behavior of the electromagnetic field (as it is
codified by Maxwell's equations). I believe it is not, because, in the only natural decomposition
of the field into parts, the parts of the system are not objects in my sense. This case is significant
because the electromagnetic field is an example of a law-governed entity whose behavior is not
subject to mechanical explanation.
The electromagnetic field is an important part of many mechanisms, from particle
accelerators to TVs to the mechanism which produces the Aurora Borealis. It is probably fair to
say that electromagnetic fields play a role in producing the great majority of physical phenomena.
Furthermore, electromagnetic fields are objects of a kind. They have a variety of properties – for
instance energy and momentum. The properties of a field can be completely described by two
vector fields, the electric field E and the magnetic field B.
Is there a mechanism that explains the properties of the electromagnetic field? If there is,
then it should be possible to decompose the field itself into parts. There is at least one sense in
which this can be done. It is quite appropriate to talk about the electric or magnetic field in a
region – for instance, the electric field between two capacitor plates, or the magnetic field of the
earth. These fields are parts of the electromagnetic field, if we conceive of this field as
occupying the entirety of space. What justifies characterizing these parts as objects is their
relatively high degree of separability from the field in surrounding space. However, this kind of
articulation of parts would not be adequate to describe a mechanism that produces an
electromagnetic field.
So far as I can see, the only possible articulation into parts consistent with the classical
theory of the electromagnetic field involves thinking of the parts of the field as points in space.
Each of these parts have the properties of electric and magnetic field strength. Such an analysis
fails because points in space are not objects in my sense. Such points are not isolable or
manipulable in themselves. It is not possible to differentiate experimentally between points in
the electromagnetic field that are sufficiently close to one another. There are no boundaries
between points in the way in which there are boundaries between, e.g., the field between the

One problem with this stipulation is that there are certain entities which I would like to
consider as objects which are in a natural sense properties. For instance, beliefs and desires (or
mental states generally) are often described as properties, but I want to allow for mechanisms in
which such entities are parts. There is nothing, however, that prevents us from viewing such
entities as objects under some descriptions and as properties under others. Under one description
beliefs and desires are properties of our brains, while under another description (if some brand of
cognitivism is right), beliefs and desires are themselves objects which have various
computational properties.
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capacitor plates and the surrounding fields.6 It is not possible to alter the electromagnetic field at
a single point. The points, while part of the mathematical description of the field as a whole,
have no physical significance apart from this description. It is crucial to a mechanical account
that a system display some behavior which can be explained by reference to underlying
properties of its constituents. But there are not, in this case, constituents with underlying
properties. As Hertz remarked, "Maxwell's theory is Maxwell's equations."
The situation would be different if there were a detectable aether. If there were in any
sense an underlying medium for the transmission of electrical and magnetic disturbances, then it
might have been possible to investigate the properties of this medium. It might have been
composed of particles and there might have been forces explaining how these particles interacted
when disturbed by external sources (a light bulb or whatever). But according to our accepted
physical theory there is no aether and there is no mechanical explanation of the electromagnetic
field. One cannot then in any physically meaningful sense go deeper.7
The interactions between parts of mechanisms are, according to (M), governed by laws. I
use the term 'law' here in essentially the same way as Goodman. Laws are generalizations (or
universal propositions) which support counterfactuals. Lawlike or nomic generalizations are
distinguished from accidental generalizations because accidental generalizations offer no such
support (Goodman, 1947; Nagel, 1961, ch. 4 ).

6

In the case of a physical "system" like the electromagnetic field, the requirement of empirical
isolability is roughly the requirement that the parts be discrete. I have used the more general term
because in cases where parts are not spatially localizable it would not be clear to what a
requirement of discreteness amounted.
7

The possibility that the electromagnetic field could be explained in terms of properties of
aether raises a further question about (M). A detectable aether would provide an explanation of
properties of the electromagnetic field, but would it then be correct to say that aether is the
mechanism that transmits electromagnetic waves? If (M) is correct, then it would only be
appropriate to call the aether a mechanism if it were possible to decompose it into discrete parts.
But it is possible that the aether would turn out to be a genuinely continuous medium, and if this
were so no such decomposition would be available. Supposing that there were a detectable
aether, there would be a further empirical question whether or not the aether was composed of
discrete particles.
In short, the possibility of a genuinely continuous aether raises a question about the generality
of (M). (M) defines mechanisms in such a way that all mechanisms are collections of discrete (in
the sense of decomposible) parts, but a continuous aether would be a sort of "continuous
mechanism". If we wished to count the aether as a mechanism, we would then have to amend the
definition (M) to allow for "continuous" mechanisms having a single continuous part. Currently,
our best physical theories do not demand such emendation.
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Some may argue that Goodman's account of laws is not adequate because it does not
provide a criterion for demarcating "deep" laws (like Newton's law of universal gravitation) from
less interesting counterfactual supporting generalizations (like whenever you leave bread on the
counter for two weeks, it molds). Although it is true that Goodman's account does not provide
such a criterion, for the purposes of my account of mechanisms, the lack of a clear distinction
between these two sorts of counterfactual supporting generalizations is a virtue. The laws used
to describe the interactions between parts of mechanisms and the laws which can be explained by
mechanisms can be of the most profound or banal sort. In explaining a mechanism whose parts
are interacting gravitationally we must invoke a rather deep law, while to explain mechanisms
like lawn mowers we mostly invoke uninteresting counterfactual supporting generalizations, such
as laws about the behavior of valves.
A more serious objection to my use of Goodman's analysis of laws is that it appeals to an
unanalyzed notion of counterfactual support. Furthermore, it seems likely that any analysis of
counterfactuals that we could give will appeal implicitly or explicitly to causal notions. Given
that I intend to use my analysis of mechanisms to explain the nature of causation, this appeal
threatens to make my analysis of causation circular. In section IV I will indicate how
mechanisms can be appealed to in a non-circular manner to explain the notion of counterfactual
support.
The final part of (M) that I wish to clarify is the stipulation that the laws governing
interactions between parts of mechanisms be direct causal laws. The stipulation that the laws be
causal is meant to exclude lawful generalizations which can be explained by common causes.
For instance, it is a lawful generalization that night follows day, but certainly day does not cause
night. Rather, the onset of day and of night are events which are both caused by the earth's
rotation. Relations between parts must be governed by causal laws because otherwise the parts
could not be said truly to interact.8
The further stipulation that causal laws be direct can be illustrated by the following
example: Consider a system consisting of a series of three or more gears of various sizes. Given
information about the number of teeth on the gears, one can state a law L1 describing the rotation
of the last gear as a function of the rotation of the first gear. L1, however, does not describe an
direct interaction between the first and last gear. The interaction is mediated by other parts
which transmit the rotation from the first to the last gear. By contrast, a law L2 describing the

8

If this account is ultimately to work, one must have an adequate way to distinguish between
these two kinds of laws. One of the most promising approaches to solving this problem is by use
of the statistical relationship known as "screening off" (See e.g., Salmon, 1984). For a discussion
of the limitations of this approach together with alternatives, see Glennan (1992, ch. 5).
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rotation of the second gear as a function of the first is direct. What we are trying to capture by
this stipulation is the sense that a mechanism is a collection of parts, in which the behavior of the
aggregate stems from a series of local interactions between parts. In saying that an immediate
interaction is local, I am not supposing that the interaction is spatially local, but only that there
are no intervening parts. For instance, if gravitation were a genuine example of action at a
distance, the gravitational interaction between the earth and the sun would be direct, because
there would be no intervening parts. This has the consequence that the notion of directness is
relativized to a particular decomposition (Glennan, 1992, ch. 3).
The analysis of mechanisms that I have given resembles a number of decompositional
strategies for explanation, notably Kauffman's articulation of parts explanation (Kauffman,
1970), Cummins' functional and morphological analysis (Cummins, 1975, 1980), and
Haugeland's systematic analysis (Haugeland, 1978). There are, however, several important
differences. First, each of these authors have emphasized the role of these explanatory strategies
within a special science (psychology for Cummins and Haugeland, and biology for Kauffman),
whereas my account is intended to apply to all sciences except fundamental physics. Second, I
have tried to illustrate the connection between decompositional strategies and the explanatory
role of mechanisms. Finally, and most importantly, I have (and will at the end of this paper)
argued that these sorts of explanations are causal explanations, and more generally, that a
relation between two events (other than fundamental physical events) is causal when and only
when these events are connected in the appropriate way by a mechanism.

3. TWO SIMPLE MECHANISMS
In this section I will show how two simple mechanisms can be analyzed in the manner
suggested by (M). The first example, a system to regulate the water level in a toilet tank, is
clearly a mechanism by anyone's account. The principles (excepting gravity) according to which
the parts interact are "strictly mechanical". The second example, a voltage switch, relies on
different, "non-mechanical" principles of operation. I will show that both of these systems may
be analyzed along the lines of (M), and thus that they are mechanisms in my sense.
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A.

A FLOAT VALVE

Fill
Point

Pressurized
Water Source
Fig. 1: A float valve
Figure 1 pictures a simple mechanism to regulate the water level in a tank. It is called a float
valve. It should be familiar to anyone who has ever opened the top of their toilet. Let us
consider, in accordance with (M), what the behavior of this mechanism is, what its parts are, and
what causal interactions occur between these parts to produce the behavior of the mechanism.
The purpose of a float valve is to regulate the water level of a tank, so it is natural (though not
required) to single out the maintenance of a certain water level in the tank (the fill point) as the
behavior of the mechanism. The operation of the mechanism is quite simple. A float is attached
to a lever which opens and closes an intake valve. When the lever is down the intake valve is
open, allowing pressurized water to fill the tank. When the lever is raised to a certain point, the
intake valve closes, stopping the flow of water. The float is heavy enough that in the absence of
water it will pull the lever down, opening the intake valve. On the other hand, it is sufficiently
buoyant that the rising water level will force the float up, closing the intake valve when water
reaches the fill point.
In describing the operation of this mechanism I have articulated a number of parts: the
tank, the valve, the pressurized water source, the lever and the float. I have also specified the
ways in which these parts are connected; that is to say, I have described the causal interactions
between the parts. If one wished, one could formulate precise laws describing these interactions.
One would do this by specifying properties of the parts, and using mathematical equations to
represent these laws.
The description of the valve raises an important issue concerning the description of
mechanisms generally. In the above description I have treated the valve as a kind of "black box"
switch. It could be replaced by any device which allows water to flow into the tank only while
the lever is in certain positions. I have not specified how the valve itself works, only how it
contributes to the operation of the float valve mechanism as a whole. The accompanying
diagram suggests some more detail. According to the diagram, the valve is a piston. As the lever
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is raised, the piston is lowered by a mechanical linkage. Since under normal operating conditions
the valve behaves according to simple laws, it is easy to treat it as a black box, abstracting away
from the details of its operation. The valve is itself a mechanism within the larger water-level
regulator mechanism. Though I have treated the valve as a simple part, one could equally well
remove references to the valve, and replace it with references to the piston, the chamber, the
lever-piston linkage, etc. This kind of reductive analysis is not limited to the valve. One could
also, for instance, give an explanation of the details of the interactions between the water and the
float; One could, so to speak, take the buoyancy mechanism out of its black box. In general,
unless the laws of interaction between the parts of a mechanism are inexplicable in terms of any
deeper physical mechanism, it will be possible to take apart the parts and look at how they
themselves work.

B. A VOLTAGE SWITCH
The float valve is a mechanism in the ordinary sense. The parts all interact by pushing
each other. Water pushes float; float pushes lever; lever closes valve; water ceases to push.
Though seventeenth century scientists would not understand the fluid mechanics as well as we do
today, the qualitative principles were well known to them. The float valve would count as a
mechanism by their lights. The voltage switch illustrated in figure 2 operates according to quite
different principles.9 This is an electric rather than a mechanical switch. There are, at least at the
macrophysical level, no moving parts. Nevertheless, it is easy to provide a mechanical analysis
of this circuit analogous to the one provided for the float valve.
VSOURCE
R2

V out

V in
R1

Ground
Fig. 2: A Voltage Switch

9

This example is taken directly from an undergraduate electronics text (Calvert and
McCausland, 1978). See §9.4 and §14.2.
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Already in describing the circuit in figure 2 as a voltage switch, I have suggested a
characterization of its behavior. The switch has two terminals, an input and an output. The
behavior of importance in characterizing this circuit as a switch is the variation of input voltage
Vin with respect to output voltage Vout. This behavior can be described quantitatively by giving a
function Vout = f(Vin). For circuits of this type, the graph of this function has a distinctive shape
illustrated in figure 3. When Vin is below a certain voltage VOFF, Vout is constant and equal to
the voltage of the power source VSOURCE. For values of Vin below VOFF the transistor is said to
be in the cutoff region. Then, for a certain interval beyond VOFF (the transient region), Vout
decreases approximately linearly as Vin increases. Finally, as Vin increases beyond the voltage
VON, the output voltage levels out at a value near to 0, the collector-emitter saturation voltage
(VCE)SAT, and remains approximately constant for larger values of Vin. If Vin ≤ VOFF, the
switch is off, indicated by Vout = VSOURCE. If Vin ≥ VON, the switch is on, indicated by Vout =
(VCE)SAT ≈ 0.

Vout

V SOURCE
Saturation
Region

Cutoff
Region

(VCE) SAT
VOFF VON
V in
Fig. 3: Input/Output Behavior for a Voltage Switching Circuit
To analyze the mechanism responsible for the switching behavior, we must now articulate
the parts of the circuit. The central part is a junction transistor (hereafter, simply transistor). The
transistor has three terminals: the base (left), the emitter (bottom) and the collector (top). The
relevant properties of the transistor are given by the saturation voltage (VCE)SAT and a parameter

β that determines the cutoff and saturation regions for the transistor. In addition there are two
resistors, the bias resistor with resistance R1 and the load resistor with resistance R2. There is
also a positive voltage source rail (top) with voltage Va and a ground (bottom). These might be
terminals of a battery. Finally there are input and output terminals. These parts are connected as
indicated in the circuit diagram.
The circuit's behavior can be summarized by two simple equations. Define VOFF to be 0
and VON to be (R1VSOURCE / βR2) Then the equations are:
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(1)

Vin ≤ VOFF

⇒

(Vout = VSOURCE)

switch off

(2)

Vin ≥ VON

⇒

(Vout ≈ 0)

switch on

The circuit is functionally a kind of current valve. When Vin ≤ VOFF (i.e., voltage entering the
base is negative), the valve is closed and no current passes from the emitter to the collector.
When Vin ≥ VON (i.e., voltage entering the base is above a small positive value), the valve is
open and current passes freely from the emitter to the collector. When VOFF <Vin < VON, the
valve is part way open, allowing restricted current flow between the emitter and the collector.
Properties of the load resistor (R2) and battery determine the voltage for the output terminal in
the on and off states. When the valve is open, these properties also determine the output current
Ic (= Va/R2) Increasing the resistance of the bias resistor R1 increases the voltage VON at which
the valve opens.
This circuit illustrates a number of important features of mechanisms and how they can
be analyzed in accordance with (M). Most importantly, this circuit is susceptible to mechanical
analysis even though it is not, in the engineer's sense, a mechanical device. Additionally, as in
the water regulator valve, the parts of the mechanism themselves are susceptible to mechanical
analysis. It is possible to give mechanical explanations (in my sense) of the properties of the
resistors, transistor, battery and conductors which indicate why they have the properties they do.
Moreover, this circuit can itself be a part of larger mechanisms. Indeed, the chief interest of
switching circuits is that they can be used as parts of larger electronic logic or control devices.
Finally, this circuit indicates how what the mechanism is depends upon how you look at it. The
description I have given of the circuit has been largely in the terms of elementary electronics. It
would also be possible to give a description in terms of the microphysics of the system. This
description would lead to a decomposition of the system in which the parts were electrons,
molecular lattices, or other such entities. It would also be possible to consider this same circuit
as a mechanism for other purposes. We could for instance consider the mechanism that produces
heat in the bias resistor. Also, by arranging so that the input current always falls into the
transient region, the same circuit can be used as a linear amplifier. The description given, though
electronic, has emphasized the potential logical properties of the circuit. Other descriptions,
appropriate to cases where input voltages typically lie within the transient region, will emphasize
its linear behavior.10

10

It is the higher level description (e.g.., whether the circuit is an amplifier or a switch), chosen
by considering the context in which the circuit occurs, that allows us to determine what aspects
of the lower-level behavior are significant as opposed to noise. For a similar point see
McClamrock 1995, ch. 1.
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The mechanisms that I have chosen to illustrate my analysis are both physical
mechanisms. I have selected them to illustrate the point that (M) places no a priori restriction on
the nature of physical interactions between parts. On the other hand, my analysis is in no way
limited to mechanisms that are physical in nature. It is meant equally to apply to chemical,
biological, psychological and other higher level mechanisms.

I emphasize this point because

the generality of the analysis is key if it is to provide a foundation for a theory of causation.11

4. FUNDAMENTAL AND MECHANICALLY EXPLICABLE LAWS
The behavior of a mechanism such as the voltage switch can be described in terms of one
or more laws (i.e., counterfactual supporting generalizations) like those given in equations (1)
and (2) above. A description of the internal structure of the mechanism explains this behavior. I
call such laws mechanically explicable.
There is an important class of laws that are not mechanically explicable — fundamental
laws. The essential feature of fundamental laws is that they are taken to represent facts about
which no further explanation is possible.12

While it is difficult to define the notion of

fundamental law and arguably impossible to devise an adequate test to determine whether or not
a law is fundamental, it is not hard to come up with a small body of laws which are nearly
unanimously regarded as fundamental. Examples from classical physics include the law of
universal gravitation and Maxwell's equations. In contemporary physics, this status is accorded
to Einstein's equation relating mass distribution to space-time curvature or to Schrödinger
equations for quantum mechanical systems. There are also many laws which, while scientifically
quite significant, are not fundamental: for example, the ideal gas law, Hooke's law, and laws of
classical genetics.
The claim for which I will argue is that all laws are either mechanically explicable or
fundamental, tertium non datur. I will refer to this thesis as the thesis of the mechanical
explicability of non-fundamental laws. In arguing for this thesis, we must be careful to construe
it in such a way that it is neither obviously false nor trivial. A strong reading of it is that every
instance of a particular lawlike regularity is explained by the operation of some particular type of
mechanism. This reading would seem to entail that laws describing the behavior of higher level
mechanisms would be type reducible to laws of a lower level theory. But a number of widely

11

Examples from sciences other than physics are discussed in Glennan (1992). Ch. 6 contains a
case study of two models of vowel normalization mechanisms that have been developed by
cognitive psychologists.

12

I am presuming that these laws are laws of physics.
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accepted arguments (Davidson, 1970; Fodor, 1974; Kitcher, 1984; Putnam, 1973; Wimsatt,
1976) suggest that type reductions of this sort are seldom possible.
A weaker reading of the thesis of the mechanical explicability of non-fundamental laws is
that every instance of a non-fundamental law is explained by the behavior of some mechanism;
but it need not be the case that the mechanisms which explain the various instances are all the
same, or even of the same kind. For a higher level law to be mechanically explicable, it must be
realized by some lower-level mechanism, but it may be multiply-realized. This reading would
entail that laws describing the behavior of higher level mechanisms are token reducible to lowerlevel laws, but not that they are type reducible.13
The weak reading allows for the possibility that there are higher level laws, every instance
of which must be explained by a different mechanism, perhaps even by a mechanism of a
radically different kind. In such cases, the laws in question would not genuinely be explained by
reference to these mechanisms, because nothing can be said about how the type of lawful
behavior is produced by mechanisms. Such strongly irreducible laws would, like fundamental
laws, resist mechanical explanation, but would, unlike fundamental laws, supervene on lower
level mechanisms.
On the weaker reading, the thesis of the mechanical explicability of non-fundamental
laws is very plausible. The problem with the weaker reading is that it seems to entail little more
than the claim that higher level processes supervene on physical processes. However, insofar as I
am committed to a particular analysis of mechanisms, the thesis says something about the way in
which supervenience occurs, and in this regard it might be false This point can be illustrated by
the aether example discussed in section II and footnote 7. If there were a genuinely continuous
aether, we would say that electromagnetic properties supervene on properties of the aether, but
we would not be able to say (without revising (M)) that the laws of electricity and magnetism
were mechanically explicable. In addition, the thesis is not primarily a claim about the relation
of higher level laws to fundamental physical mechanisms, but rather a claim about the relation of
higher level laws to lower level mechanisms generally. If one considers, for instance, the
mechanism that explains Mendel's second law (the law of independent assortment of genes in
gametes), the natural level of explanation is cytological. Mendel's second law holds (when it
holds) because genes are often located on different chromosomes (or far away on the same

13

It would take a fuller exposition to spell out the relationship between different interpretations
of mechanical explicability and various types of reducibility. As framed by Fodor (1974), type
and token reducibility are theses about the reducibility of theoretical terms and laws of one theory
to theoretical terms and laws of another. While there is an analogous reduction relations between
laws and the mechanisms which realize them, some work must be done to show how type
reducibility of laws and theoretical terms is related to type reducibility of mechanisms.
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chromosome), and given how meiosis works, a gamete is created by choosing "randomly" one
chromosome from each chromosome pair. And while one could look at the mechanisms that
explain meiosis, the mechanisms that explain Mendel's second law are cytological, not physical.
A key feature of mechanically explicable laws is that there is an unproblematic way to
understand the counterfactuals which they sustain. Consider a generalization about my car
starting when I turn the key. I am justified in asserting "If I were to turn the key, the car would
start" because I know that there is a mechanism which connects key-turning with car-starting. I
also know the sorts of circumstances in which the counterfactual would turn out to be false,
namely breakdown conditions for the mechanism which explains it. I know for instance that my
key-turning would not lead to car-starting if the weather is too cold, or if there is no gas in the
gas tank, because I understand the role of the battery and the gas in the ignition mechanism.
Counterfactual generalizations can be understood in this way without appealing to unanalyzed
notions of cause, propensity, possible world, or the like.
We are now in a position to partially address the worry raised in section II about whether
the use of laws to describe the interactions of parts of mechanisms involves a circular appeal to
causal notions. If the laws in question are mechanically explicable, then their lawlike (i.e.,
counterfactual-supporting) character can be explicated by reference to the further mechanisms
which explain these laws.

There remains the difficulty of understanding the source of

lawlikeness for fundamental laws. I will not offer a solution to this last problem here, but I will
argue in the final section that the absence of an account of the lawlikeness of fundamental laws
does not undermine a mechanical analysis of higher level laws and causal relations.

5. TOWARDS A MECHANICAL THEORY OF CAUSATION
I claimed at the outset of this paper that my theory of mechanisms could provide the
foundation for a theory of causation. Although to spell out such a theory and defend it in any
detail is beyond the scope of this paper, I can indicate briefly how such a theory would go, and
suggest some consequences of the theory.
Before outlining such a theory, we should consider very generally the problems any
theory of causation should solve. There are a number of standard ones: distinguishing real from
spurious correlations; distinguishing lawlike from accidental generalizations; distinguishing real
effects from artifacts. These are all instances of what we can, using Humean terminology, call
the connection-conjunction problem. How does one distinguish connections from conjunctions?
Humean approaches seek to solve the problem by giving criteria that distinguish true from
accidental regularities. Anti-Humean approaches typically appeal to some further notion of
necessity (logical or natural) which distinguishes conjunctions from connections. I think that
-17-

both of these approaches run into insurmountable difficulties, but I will not discuss these
difficulties here.14 Rather, I want to indicate how a mechanical theory tackles the connectionconjunction problem.
Roughly put, a mechanical theory of causation suggests that two events are causally
connected when and only when there is a mechanism connecting them. How such a theory works
is most clear in a case where the behavior can be described by a conditional. Take for instance
the voltage switch discussed in section III.
summarized by three conditionals:
(1)
Vin ≤ VOFF
(2)

Vin ≥ VON

(3)

VOFF <Vin < VON

The behavior of the voltage switch can be

⇒

Vout = VSOURCE

⇒

Vout = (VCE)SAT ≈ 0

(VCE)SAT <Vout < VSOURCE
⇒
Because there is a mechanism which underlies this behavior, we can say, e.g., that increasing the
input voltage from less than VOFF to greater than VON causes a change in the output voltage
from (VCE)SAT to VSOURCE.
The chief virtue of the theory is that it makes the connection-conjunction problem a
scientific one. If one can formulate and confirm a theory that postulates a mechanism connecting
two events, then one has produced evidence that these events are causally connected. The
necessity that distinguishes connections from accidental conjunctions is to be understood as
deriving from a underlying mechanism, where the existence and nature of such a mechanism is
open to empirical investigation. The mechanical account allows us to escape the regularity
theory's difficulties with the connection-conjunction problem, while eschewing, as Hume did,
reference to any metaphysical notion of necessity.
There is however an obvious limitation to the mechanical theory. Sooner or later the
process of decomposition of a system into parts must come to an end. This is the level of
fundamental laws. At this point we cannot point to any further or deeper mechanism. Since

14

I suggest some reasons in ch. 8 of Glennan (1992). See also Salmon (1984) for an excellent
discussion of why regularity theories cannot solve the connection-conjunction problem. In that
book (chs. 5, 6 and 9), Salmon proposes an account of causation that is meant to address this
problem and that in certain ways parallels my own account. Space does not permit me to discuss
Salmon's theory in detail, so I can only mention one problem which suggests that his theory is
incomplete. Salmon's theory is concerned with distinguishing causal processes from what he
calls "pseudo-processes". Pseudo-processes are the sorts of things which produce non-causal but
lawlike regularities. Salmon's criterion for distinguishing between these processes is that causal
processes can transmit "marks". Salmon has unfortunately not explained why causal processes
transmit marks where pseudo-processes do not. The true difference between causal processes
and pseudoprocesses can only be explained, in my view, by considering the differences in the
mechanisms underlying them.
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there is no mechanism, how do we explain the causal connection between events at the level of
fundamental physics? The mechanical theory offers us no answers, and I will not try to add
anything about the problem here.15 For the moment, it is sufficient to recognize that whatever
explains causal relations in fundamental physics is very different from that which explains causal
relations at higher level.
There are two potentially serious objections to the theory that I have presented. The first
of these alleges that any analysis of causation that relies on mechanisms is circular, since any
explication of the concept of mechanism requires the use of causal concepts. Of course one may
identify a mechanism by articulating a system into parts and describing the behavior of the
various parts; one may formulate statements describing the interactions between these parts and
show how the behavior of the system as a whole (the effect) derives from the interactions
between these parts. However, what does it mean to say that these parts interact? Is it not
essential to the mechanical theory that changes in the properties of some parts cause changes in
the properties of other parts?
This circularity is only apparent. In describing the mechanism that connects the two
events I have explained how these events are causally connected. How the parts are connected is
a different question. I can try to answer this second question by offering another account of the
mechanisms which connect them, but I need not give such an account to explain the connection
between the events. Indeed, such an account would only obscure the causally relevant features of
the original explanation.16 The supposed circularity is analogous to the apparent circularity
involved in the recursive definitions of sentences of predicate logic. A typical clause of such a
definition would be 'if p and q are sentences, then (p & q ) is also a sentence'. Whether a string
of symbols is a sentence depends upon whether certain other strings of symbols are sentences,
but we are not offering a circular definition, because the sentences used in the definition can
themselves be defined without reference to the sentence in whose definition they are being used.
Similarly, in giving account of how two events are causally connected, I refer to a mechanism
which in turn refers to causal relations, but these latter causal relations are different (and more
basic) relations than the one which I am seeking to explain.

15

I discuss how to explicate fundamental causal relations in a way that dovetails with the
mechanical account in Glennan (1995).

16

Kitcher (1984) makes a similar observation in his discussion of his thesis R3.
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The second objection cannot so easily be defeated.

Even granting that we can

progressively explain interactions at one level in terms of mechanisms at the next, sooner or later,
we are going to run out of levels and come to interactions governed by fundamental laws. I grant
without argument that these fundamental interactions cannot be explained by the mechanical
theory.

But the fact that the mechanical theory gives us no account of such interactions

combined with the fact that any mechanism depends ultimately on there being causal connections
at the level of fundamental physics might lead us to believe that the mechanical theory has given
us no account of causation at all. The objection is made eloquently by Hume:
It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles,
productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many
particular effects into a few general causes…. But as to the causes of these
causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery….
The most perfect
philosophy of a natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer… (Hume,
1777, pp. 30-31).
Certainly Hume is correct that there must be some facts which we cannot explain by reference to
further more general principles (or mechanisms). Our explanations must stop somewhere. The
question at issue is whether this ultimate dependence on unexplained regularities demands that
we give up the mechanical theory and adopt a regularity theory of causation.
To understand why we are not forced to adopt a regularity theory, we must look at how it
is that we in fact evaluate the truth of causal claims. Although there are many ways to do this, I
submit that the best way to evaluate such claims is to find the mechanism responsible for the
supposed causal connection. If for instance, we want to show that smoking causes cancer, the
best way to do so would be to discover the mechanism by which tar, nicotine, etc. interact with
the body to produce cancerous cells. We might provide overwhelming statistical evidence to
show the correlation between smoking and cancer, but so long as we do not understand the
mechanism in question, we can still wonder whether or not the correlation indicates that smoking
causes cancer.17 Not only are regularities insufficient to establish causal connections, they are
unnecessary as well. Once we have identified the mechanism, we need not acquire additional
evidence for the regularities it produces. Also, further detail about the nature or operations of the
parts of the mechanism are not relevant. The best way to find out if it is a dead battery that is
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A similar point has been made in the case of evolutionary biology by Sober and Lewontin
(1982). They argue that the existence of actual or dispositional regularities between events (or
properties) is not sufficient for attributing a causal relationship between those events (or
properties). They conclude from this that regularity accounts of causation are inadequate. The
mechanical theory of causation I have presented allows one to distinguish between causal and
artifactual correlations of this sort.
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preventing my car from starting is to use a voltmeter to test the battery's charge. Once I have
established that the battery has no charge, I have sufficiently confirmed my hypothesis, and
taking apart the battery will provide no additional evidence.

Although the mechanism

responsible for connecting two events may supervene upon other lower-level mechanisms, and
ultimately on mechanically inexplicable laws of fundamental physics, it is not these laws which
make the causal claim true; rather, it is the structure of the higher level mechanism and the
properties of its parts.
To illustrate some of the benefits of a point of view which treats causation in fundamental
physics differently from higher level causation, I would like briefly to sketch how the point of
view of the mechanical theory can shed light on an interpretive problem in the quantum theory.
It is often said that the quantum theory, while extraordinarily successful as a predictive
instrument, cannot be said to explain the phenomena that it predicts. This predicament comes
out most clearly in the case of the "unexplainable" correlations produced by EPR type
experiments.18 The problem may be illustrated as follows. It is possible to construct a device
which shoots a pair of particles in opposite directions to distant targets. These particles can be
prepared in such a way that, upon hitting these targets they will deflect in one of two directions,
up or down. It is not possible using this preparation technique to determine in advance which
direction they will go. However, quantum mechanics predicts and experiment confirms that if
one particle deflects up then the other particle will deflect down and vice versa.
There seem to be two explanations which might account for this correlation. First, there
might be some signal sent from one target to the other. This possibility is ruled out (if relativity
theory is right) by placing the targets so far apart that any interactions would require signals to
travel faster than the speed of light. Alternatively, one might think that the preparation of the
particle pair puts the particles into a certain state which causes them to go in one direction or the
other when they reach the target. Surprisingly, however, mathematical results (so called nohidden-variable-theory results) indicate that there can be no such state.
This result is generally considered to be very strange and hard to understand. It indicates
(consistently with experimental evidence) that there are correlations between events where
neither a direct causal connection nor an indirect connection via a common-cause can possibly
account for that correlation. I think that the analysis of causation that I have offered shows why
we should not be so surprised. What is so puzzling about the correlation in question is that there
is no mechanism which could possibly connect the events occurring at the two targets and that

18

For a discussion of EPR correlations see, e.g., Shimony (1989).
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there is no mechanism which could possibly connect them each to some third common cause.
However, if one believes that quantum mechanical laws describe the most fundamental physics,
then one does not believe that there is a deeper mechanism anyway. And if there is no such
mechanism, what reason is there to believe that distal events should or should not be correlated?
Our uneasiness derives in part because we expect that the laws describing this quantum
mechanical system should have properties similar to those of mechanically explicable laws; but
there is no reason to have such an expectation. It is an artifact of our belief that there is
something behind the regularities.
The mechanical theory of causation rejects a wide-spread assumption about the nature of
causation.

I think that it is generally assumed that whatever causal connections are, they

ultimately have something to do with the most fundamental physical processes. The closer we
are to fundamental physics, the more our statements are about the true causes of things; the
further we stray into the higher level sciences, the more we move away from causal statements
and toward mere empirical generalizations. This assumption, however, is what makes Hume's
skepticism so devastating. On this assumption causes are the ultimate metaphysical glue which
holds fundamental physical events together. Hume provides a convincing argument that we can
have no knowledge of this glue, and that talk of such glue may even be unintelligible. The solution to these difficulties is to reverse the initial assumption. Causal statements are typically
statements about events regulated by mechanisms, and mechanisms are complex, higher level
entities. Only when we talk about interactions governed by fundamental laws does causal talk
become problematic.
To what extent have we have solved Hume's problem?

To what degree have we

uncovered the secret connexion that binds together causally connected events? At the level of
fundamental physics, Hume's problem still remains. We can observe certain regularities, but we
cannot offer an explanation of why those regularities obtain. It is not good enough to say that in
physics there just are regularities, for there are still questions about which regularities are lawful
and causal. Despite the difficulties that remain, we have shown that Hume's problem is not a
universal one. In the case of higher level laws, we can distinguish between connections and
conjunctions, because we can understand the mechanisms which produce higher level
regularities. Very often, the connexion is not so secret after all.
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